I. MODEL DEFINITION A. Spatial games and evolutionary graph theory
We consider stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with two strategies in a structured population of finite size, N . A focal player can be of type A, or B, and interact with all of its neighbors according to the underlying population structure. In the model, each individual occupies a vertex of a graph. The edges denote connections between players in terms of interaction of game. Here we only consider that the interaction graph and the replacement graph are identical, although they need not be the same [1] . In individual encounters, players obtain their payoffs from simultaneous actions. Based on all the interactions, an average payoff of an individual is calculated based on the payoff matrix as follows In the following, we introduce an update rule based on a global level of aspiration. This allows us to define a Markov chain describing the inherently stochastic dynamics in a finite population:
probabilistic change of the composition of the population is driven by the fact that each individual compares its actual payoff to an imaginary value that it aspires. Note here that we are only interested in the simplest way to model such a complex problem and do not address any learning process that may adjust such an aspiration level as the system evolves.
B. Aspiration-level-driven stochastic dynamics
We consider the simplest case of an entire population having a certain level of aspiration. Players needn't see any particular payoffs but their own, which they compare with an aspired value.
This level of aspiration, α, is a variable that influences the stochastic strategy updating. The probability of switching strategy is random when individuals' payoffs are close to the level of aspiration, reflecting the basic degree of uncertainty in the population. When payoffs exceed the aspiration, strategy switching is unlikely. At high values of aspiration compared with payoffs, switching probabilities are high.
The level of aspiration provides a global benchmark of tolerance or dissatisfaction in the population. In addition, when modeling human strategy updating, one typically introduces another global parameter, the intensity of selection, ω, which provides a measure for how important individuals deem the impact of the actual game on their update. Irrespective of the aspiration level and the frequency dependent payoff distribution, vanishing values of ω refer to nearly random strategy updating. For large values of ω, individuals' deviations from their aspiration level have a strong impact on the dynamics.
Note that although the level of aspiration is a global variable and does not differ individually, owing to payoff inhomogeneity there can always be a part of the population that seeks to switch more often due to dissatisfaction with the payoff distribution.
In our microscopic update process, we randomly choose an individual, x, from the population, and assume that the average payoff of the focal individual is π x . To model stochastic aspirationdriven switching, we can use the following probability function
which is similar to the Fermi-rule [2, 3] , but replaces a randomly drawn opponent's payoff by the aspiration level. The wider the positive gap between aspiration and payoff, the higher the switching probability. Reversely, if payoffs exceed the level of aspiration individuals become less active with increasing payoffs. The aspiration level, α, provides the benchmark used to evaluate how "greedy" an individual is. Higher aspiration levels mean that individuals aspire to higher payoffs. The selection intensity governs how strict individuals are in this respect. For ω = 0, strategy switching is entirely random (neutral). Low values of ω lead to switching only slightly different from random but follow the impact of α. For increasing ω, the impact of the difference between payoffs and the aspiration becomes more important. In the case of ω → ∞, individuals are strict in the sense that they either switch strategies with probability one if they are not satisfied, or stay with their current strategy if their aspiration level is met or overshot.
Compared with imitation (pairwise comparison) dynamics, our self-learning process, which is essentially an Ehrenfest-like Markov chain, has some different characteristics. Without the introduction of mutation or random strategy exploration, there exists a stationary distribution for the aspiration-driven dynamics. Even in a homogenous population, there is a positive probability that an individual can switch to another strategy owing to the dissatisfaction resulting from payoffaspiration difference. This facilitates the escape from absorbing states in the pairwise comparison process and other Moran-like evolutionary dynamics. Hence there exists a nontrivial stationary distribution of the Markov chain satisfying detailed balance.
In the following analysis, we are interested in the limit of weak selection, ω 1, and its ability to predict the success of cooperation in evolutionary games in structured populations. The weak selection, which has a long standing history in population genetics and molecular evolution [4] , also plays a role in social learning and cultural evolution. Recent experimental results suggest that the intensity with which humans adjust their strategies might be low [5] . Although it has been unclear to what degree and in what way human strategy updating deviates from random [6, 7] , the weak selection limit is of importance to quantitatively characterize the evolutionary dynamics.
In the limiting case of weak selection, we are able to analytically classify strategies with respect to the neutral benchmark, ω → 0 [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . We note that a strategy is favored by selection, if its average abundance under weak selection is greater than one half. In the following, we describe a perturbation method on regular graphs in detail. The method is based on pair approximation [13] [14] [15] [16] , and is valid in the limit of N k.
II. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

A. Evolutionary games in general regular graphs
Let p A and p B denote the frequencies of A and B in the population. Let p AA , p AB , p BA and p BB denote the frequencies of AA, AB, BA and BB pairs. Pair approximation means that the frequencies of larger clusters are derived from the frequencies of pair. Let q X|Y denote the conditional probability to find an X-player given that the adjacent node is occupied by a Y -player. Here, both X and Y stand for A or B.
The identities
imply that the whole system can be described by only two variables, p A and p AA , in pair approximation.
Each player derives a payoff from interaction with all its neighbors. At each time step, a random player is chosen. Let k A and k B denote the numbers of A and B players among these k neighbors.
We have k A + k B = k. The payoffs are
The focal player compares its payoff with the aspiration level α. The individual stays with its own strategy or switches to the other with probability 1/[1 + e −ω(α−πx) ], where x represents A or B.
First we calculate the probabilities that the variables p A and p AA change during one time step.
Updating a B-player
A B player is eliminated with probability p B . The frequency of such a configuration is
B|B . Therefore, p A increases by 1/N with probability
Regarding pairs, the number of AA-pairs increases by k A and therefore p AA increases by k A /(kN/2) with probability
Updating an A-player
An A player is eliminated with probability p A . The frequency of such a configuration is
B|A . Therefore, p A decreases by 1/N with probability
Regarding pairs, the number of AA-pairs decreases by k A and therefore p AA decreases by k A /(kN/2) with probability
Pair approximation
Let us now suppose that one replacement event takes place in one unit of time. The time derivatives of p A and p AA are given bẏ
where
For ω = 0, the equilibrium of Eqs (9) and (10) 
Inserting Eq. (12) into Eq.(9), it leads tȯ
The equilibrium can be obtained fromṗ A = 0. Since the selection intensity ω is weak, we neglect the higher selection intensity term O(ω 2 ). Thus the equilibrium p * A (ω) fulfils
Note that ω > 0, thus if a + b > c + d, p A > 1/2. And it is true for any α.
Therefore, it implies that under weak selection, aspiration dynamics does not alter the average abundance of a strategy in a pairwise game, irrespective of the aspiration and the average degree of a regular graph.
B. Evolutionary games in a well-mixed population
In a well-mixed population, any two individuals interact with each other with the same probability. The well-mixed population is a basic reference case when studying strategy selection in structured populations. Particularly, it represents a special case, for example, in evolutionary graph theory, a complete graph with identical weights. In order to come to a quantitative comparison between strategies, we calculate the stationary distribution over the abundance of strategy A
The expected payoffs for any A or B in a finite well-mixed population of size N with i players of type A and N − i players of type B, are given by
The spread of successful strategies is modeled as follows in discrete time. In one time step, three events are possible: the abundance of A, i, can increase by one with probability p( i → i + 1 ) = T + i , decrease by one with probability p( i → i − 1 ) = T − i , or stay the same with probability p( i → i ) = T 0 i . All other transitions occur with probability zero. The transition probabilities are given by
In each time step, a randomly chosen individual obtains its payoff in the evolutionary game, given by Eqs. (15) or (16), and compares it with the level of aspiration. Individual changes strategy with probability lower than 1/2 if its payoff exceeds the aspiration. Otherwise, it switches with probability greater than 1/2, except when the aspiration level is exactly met, in which case it switches randomly (note that this is very unlikely to ever be the case).
The Markov chain given by Eqs. (17)-(19) satisfies the detailed balance condition ψ j−1 T
is the stationary distribution over the abundance of A in equilibrium [17, 18] . Considering N j=0 ψ j = 1, we find the exact solution by recursion, given by
where q
l is the probability of successive transitions from j to k. The analytical solution Eq. (20) allows us to find the exact value of the average abundance of strategy A,
for any strength of selection.
To better understand the effects of selection intensity, aspiration level, and payoff matrix on the average abundance of strategy A, we further analyze which strategy is more abundant based on Eq. (20). For a fixed population size, under weak selection, i.e. ω → 0, the stationary distribution ψ j (ω) can be expressed approximately as
where the neutral stationary distribution is simply given by ψ j (0) = C j N /2 N , and the first order term of this Taylor expansion amounts to
Interestingly, in the limiting case of weak selection, the first order approximation of the stationary distribution of A does not depend on the aspiration level. For higher order terms of selection intensity, however, ψ j (ω) does depend on the aspiration level.
Based on the approximation (22), with two strategies of normal form (1), we can calculate a weak selection condition such that in equilibrium A is more abundant than B. As for neutrality,
N holds, and thus X A (0) = 1/2, it is sufficient to consider positivity of the sum
It is similar to the concept of risk-dominance translated to finite populations [10] . For a detailed derivation of this analytical result, see Appendix.
Appendix: Derivation process of the criterion for well mixed population
In this appendix, we detail the derivation process of the criterion of X A (ω) > 1/2. We consider the first order approximation of stationary distribution, ψ j (ω), and get the criterion condition as follows:
Inserting Eq. (20), we have
Denoting ψ j (ω) = ψ N /ψ D , the above equation can be simplified as
Owing to ω → 0,
Then, inserting Eqs. (32)-(37) into Eq. (28),
Similarly, we can get
And
ψ N | ω=0 = j−1 i=0
Therefore, inserting Eqs. (38)- (41) into Eq. (27),
Combined with Eq. (25), the criterion is rewritten as
where π A (i) and π B (i − 1) refer to Eqs. (15) 
Thus, we get the criterion of X A (ω) > 1/2 as Eq. (47). We rewrite this as follows
